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Abstract 
This paper offers a substantive contribution to the debate on the role of international 
trade on the development of emerging countries. The aim is to detect empirically the 
phenomenon of vulnerability induced by trade openness. The methodology adopts a 
forward-looking approach and tries to fill a missing link in the theory between trade 
shocks, volatility, and the wellbeing of countries, distinguishing between ‘normal’ and 
‘extreme’ volatility. 
The analysis is focused on Europe, in consideration of the dramatic and unprecedented 
trade liberalization process experienced by the Central and Eastern European countries 
at the beginning of the 1990s.  
The main result of the analysis is that in spite of the apparent association between trade 
openness and good macroeconomic performance, Eastern European countries have 
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experienced a worsening of their macroeconomic wellbeing because of the trade shocks 
of the early 1990s. This preliminary evidence, remarkably strong also in the case of the 
poorest sections of the population, spurs some relevant policy implications, both at the 
national and supranational levels. 
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Trade liberalization is the emerging issue of development studies. On the one hand, 
common wisdom suggests that openness to trade and factor flows offer remarkable 
opportunities for the economic and political progress of countries; hence, the main 
international organizations advocate structural reforms centred on trade openness for the 
developing countries. On the other hand, such openness translates into a growing feeling 
of insecurity and ‘vulnerability’. This fosters intense political debate on the options and 
strategies available for helping developing countries fully capture the benefits of trade 
integration, and for reducing the likely negative effects.1 This debate is currently in 
place within the WTO in the throes of carrying out the Doha Development Agenda and 
also within the EU under the framework of the new Cotonou Agreement, which 
established a set of Regional Economic Partnership Agreements with developing 
countries in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific—and of the enlargement towards CEECs 
(Central and Eastern European Countries). 
This paper aims to empirically analyse whether the feeling of insecurity and 
vulnerability linked to trade liberalization can be justified in economic terms and 
whether policymakers should be genuinely worried. The aim is not to build a case 
against liberalization, but instead, help policymakers design and implement a new set of 
preventive policies and move towards a more forward-looking attitude.  
The objective of the paper is twofold: to provide a substantive contribution to the debate 
on the role of trade liberalization on the macroeconomic performance of emerging 
countries, with a focus on the experience of Central and Eastern Europe. At the same 
time, the paper attempts to raise awareness of the vulnerability that may be induced as a 
likely side effect by trade liberalization.  
A crucial question of this analysis is how to strike a balance between the advantages of 
an open economy and the disadvantages of greater exposure to external shocks? 
Considering the redistributive nature of trade, it is certainly not possible to denounce 
any shock that may cause even a single individual to suffer a reduction in income 
(Winters 2000). Moreover, in countries with low levels of trade, it is reasonable to 
assume that greater trade liberalization would reduce risk exposure rather than increase 
it, because larger world markets (with many players) tend to be more stable than smaller 
domestic ones (Winters 2000). However, should foreign shocks be largely unpredicted 
and greater than domestic ones, the opposite effect would ensue.  
Practically speaking, there is a substantial grey area where countries enjoy a fair degree 
of stability but the probability to be hurt by external shocks could be high (Winters 
2000). The object of this ‘trade vulnerability’ analysis is to gain a better understanding 
of this grey area.  
In this respect, the case of the CEECs is particularly instructive. Since the early 1990s, 
the CEECs have experienced a dramatic and unprecedented process of political change, 
economic liberalization and institutional reform (Svejnar 2002). This, at the beginning 
of the transition process, created an economic slowdown of a magnitude never 
witnessed during peacetime years (Mundell 1995). The CEECs recovered only after a 
                                                 
1  On these issues, see also Yusuf (2001) and also several essays in Ocampo et al. (2000).  
2 
number of years, following a U-shaped ‘transition’ curve (Figure A1). This economic 
slowdown has been explained, among others, by the occurrence of several negative 
trade shocks, such as the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon),
2 the discontinuation of the traditional trade linkages with the former USSR, 
as well as the immediate shift to world prices in foreign trade (Blanchard 1997). Did 
these shocks cause once-for-all or permanent effects? or, in other words, did they add to 
the vulnerability of the CEECs with regard to their socioeconomic conditions?  
This paper attempts to answer these questions. The work is organized as follows: in the 
first part (sections 2, 3 and 4), we present a brief review of the literature drawn from 
apparently distant areas of research: trade openness (section 2.1) as well as vulnerability 
(section 2.2), and carry out some steps towards a macro-approach of vulnerability to 
trade openness (sections 3 and 4). In the second part, we present an empirical exercise 
on the vulnerability to trade openness in Europe. For this purpose, some stylized facts 
on the macroeconomic performance of European countries, both in terms of growth and 
volatility, are reviewed in section 5 and an empirical application for Europe for the 
period 1990-2000 is carried out in section 6. Finally, section 7 proposes a measurement 
of vulnerability to trade openness for European countries. Section 8 tests this 
measurement on the poorest population quintiles, and section 9 draws some conclusions 
and policy implications. 
2  Review of the literature 
2.1  On the effects of trade openness  
Mainstream international economics based on the Heckscher-Ohlin theory asserts that 
international trade produces benefits for all participants. Countries and individuals 
specialize according to their comparative advantage, and relative prices of goods and 
factors tend to converge. 
Over time, numerous studies, presenting substantial empirical evidence, explored 
additional issues such as the effects of trade openness on partner countries. These 
include: the impact of trade liberalization on poverty (Timmer 1997; Delgado et al. 
1998; Mellor and Gavian 1999); and on inequality between and within countries 
(Frankel 2000; Ben-David 1993; Cornia and Court 2001; Milanovic 2003); the 
relationship between trade integration and economic growth (Edwards 1993; Frankel 
and Romer 1999; Dollar and Kraay 2001); and the role of policies and institutions 
(Krueger 1990; Ades and Di Tella 1997 and 1999; Lall and Pietrobelli 2002). (For an 
extensive review of the effects of trade liberalization on the wellbeing of partner 
countries, see McCulloch, Winters and Cirera 2001.) 
Our intent here is to shed light on an additional issue regarding the effect of trade 
openness, with special focus on the relationship between trade liberalization, its 
associated risks, macro volatility and vulnerability. On this subject, the most complete 
                                                 
2  The Comecon was established in 1949 with the aim to promote economic, scientific and technological 
cooperation and develop economic integration among the following socialist member countries: 
USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Albania (1949); East Germany (1950), 
Mongolia (1962); Cuba (1972) and Vietnam (1978).  
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and thorough analysis to date remains the work of Glick and Rose (1999). They indicate 
with empirical evidence how trade linkages should be first among the factors in 
explaining regional contagion during currency crises. Later Forbes (2001) examines 
how trade can transmit crises internationally via three distinct, and possibly 
counteracting, channels: the competitiveness effect (when changes in relative prices 
affect a country’s ability to compete abroad); the income effect (when a crisis affects 
incomes and the demand for imports); and the cheap-import effect (when a crisis 
reduces import prices and acts as a positive supply shock). The author suggests that 
trade effects are not only statistically significant, but also quantitatively relevant (Forbes 
2001). However, Corsetti et al. (2000), and Wincoop and Yi (2000) have remarked that 
these channels could counteract and balance each other out, and the resulting aggregate 
impact of trade linkages could be small. Another relevant strand of literature on the 
same issue, but with different techniques and objectives, is related to the ‘small states’ 
(Atkins and Mazzi 1999; Easterly and Kraay 1999). 
2.2  Vulnerability: theoretical and methodological references  
Vulnerability as a method of analysis does not override traditional approaches. Instead, 
it offers a new lens for examining the dynamics of development. It can be defined as the 
‘continuous forward-looking state of expected outcomes’ (Alwang, Siegel and 
Jorgensen 2001) which themselves are determined by the characteristics of the unit of 
analysis, the correlation, frequency, timing and severity of shocks, as well as by the risk 
management instruments applied (Heitzmann, Canagarajah and Siegel 2001). Risks, in 
fact, are only one side of the coin. While risks are exogenous, vulnerability is 
endogenous as it is the result of strategies employed by individuals and communities 
facing the risks (Dercon 2001). It is important to underline that while wellbeing and 
poverty are ex-post outcomes, vulnerability is an ex-ante condition which could 
potentially lead to a negative outcome. Consequently, what really matters in assessing 
vulnerability is not the current values of the phenomena, but the ability to understand its 
future dynamics and intervene as needed. Vulnerability, in this light, could be 
considered as an evolutionary process generated by cumulative factors (Davies 1996).3 
Vulnerability is indeed a complex subject. It is not determined by one, easily 
measurable factor. There are many sources of risk that interact with each other, as well 
as many different types of risk management strategies.4 Moreover, risk management 
                                                 
3   This is a central point. Some disciplines consider vulnerability to be something which is very similar 
to ex-post poverty outcome assessments. Instead, a proper vulnerability assessment requires ex-ante 
analysis of the exogenous risk factors and risk management tools. While many international 
organizations (e.g. FAO, World Bank, UNDP, USAID) have made significant strides in improving our 
understanding of vulnerability, a proliferation of multiple methodologies, terminology and approaches 
to vulnerability exists, involving as diverse areas of interest as food security, conflict prevention, etc. 
(Triulzi and Montalbano 2002). 
4  Most approaches place particular emphasis on elaborating the classification of risks, risk response 
strategies and livelihood characteristics of households and communities. It is widely agreed that risks 
derive from a variety of natural, political, social and economic sources. Some methodologies (e.g., the 
World Bank) also distinguish between the characteristics of the risk, such as frequency, magnitude, 
intensity and correlation  (World Bank 2003b). This depth of risk classification, however, is not 
widespread. Some experts prefer to use the term ‘life event’ instead of ‘shocks’ or ‘stress’ in order to 
allow for the inclusion of an active component, in contrast to a perception of the poor as passive social 
actors. Risk management tools are also analysed and grouped into specific categories in most  
4 
instruments need to be aimed at not only preventing risks, but more importantly also at 
encouraging individuals to take risks in a more conscious, beneficial and profitable 
manner with a long-term outlook (Holzmann 2001b).  
As a result, there is no unanimous and consistent approach to vulnerability. However, 
there are a number of possible measurements of the phenomenon, which depend on the 
context in which vulnerability is actually analysed.5 Economic literature, using among 
others a monetary measure, analyses vulnerability as a possible loss of wellbeing due to 
a combination of risks and management tools. There are currently a number of different 
approaches to vulnerability analysis from the economic point of view: (i) the exposure 
to observed risks (Amin, Rai and Topa 1999; Dercon and Krishnan 2000; Glewwe and 
Hall 1998); (ii) expected poverty (Chaudhuri, Jalan and Suryahadi 2002; Christiaensen 
and Boisvert 2000; Pritchett, Suryahadi and Sumarto 2000); and (iii) expected utility 
(Calvo and Dercon 2003; Ligon and Schechter 2003).6 These studies adopt primarily a 
micro approach and focus on households. As argued by Hoddinott and Quisumbing 
(2003), all these contributions seek to measure vulnerability by adopting a two-step 
procedure: first, they estimate the distribution of future consumption expenditures and 
then construct a statistic from this estimated distribution in order to capture the 
reduction in household welfare resulting from the risk in household consumption 
expenditures.  
3  Towards a macro approach to vulnerability  
This paper adopts a macro lens and a slightly different approach than most of the 
available literature. The decision to focus on aggregate variables and not on households 
data is due to several considerations. First of all, this is due to the recognition that the 
economic process of globalization creates different circumstances in which endogenous, 
micro and natural shocks are becoming less important than ‘man-made’ external macro 
shocks. Especially in the last decade the incidence of macro shocks at the international 
level has been quantitatively very relevant. Between 1990 and 1997, more than 80 per 
cent of the developing countries experienced at least one year of negative per capita 
output growth as a result of an economic crisis, natural disaster or conflict (World Bank 
2000a). These shocks, the result of a perverse combination of international turmoil and 
                                                                                                                                               
vulnerability approaches. These instruments are generally divided into reduction,  mitigation and 
coping mechanisms. The sustainable livelihoods approach, for example, focuses on short-term coping 
strategies and long-term adaptive behavioural changes (UNDP 1999). 
5  There is, generally speaking, an intrinsic incompatibility between the completeness of the definition of 
vulnerability and its ability to be empirically valid (Alwang, Siegel and Jorgensen 2001). The problem 
for a quantitative analysis is to isolate a simple measure (or set of measures) that is comparable across 
time and location (Gamanou and Morduch 2002). The information requirements are high and no 
straightforward measurement of hypothetical situations is possible via survey data. Currently, most of 
the applications used infer the distributions of possible outcome shocks from the error process in 
cross-section regression models explaining consumption outcomes by household and community 
variables. This implies strong assumptions on how shocks evolve over time and space. The data 
needed to construct outcome-based measures are many, while they do not give much insight on how 
the poor cope with vulnerability (Dercon 2001). Other measures may help to fill these gaps, such as 
for example, the sustainable livelihoods approaches, which focus on assets. 
6  See Ligon and Schechter (2004) for an overview.  
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political economy mismanagement, have manifested themselves in various forms 
(public budget, balance of payments, currency and banking crises; hyperinflation, etc.) 
and affected, in various instances,7 primarily the most integrated countries in the world 
economy (Easterly and Kraay 1999). In this new scenario, traditional social 
relationships and local market structures in developing countries are facing entirely new 
challenges, while the traditional coping mechanisms are under pressure and a vast 
proportion of the population has no means to benefit from the competition at 
international level (Dercon 2001). Furthermore, ‘macro’ covariate shocks (i.e., shocks 
that occur at the national or regional level) have been shown to impact more severely on 
the poor even when shocks do not affect people disproportionately (Lustig 2000). Along 
the same lines recent empirical works (Lundberg and Squire 2003) argue that trade 
openness erodes income growth in the bottom quintile of the population because of the 
poor’s limited ability to save and their lack of access to general public or private safety 
net systems (World Bank 2000a).  
The second reason that calls for a macro approach is related to policy. Recent events 
highlight the paucity of ‘ex-ante’ international macroeconomic policies that would be 
capable of properly recognizing and coping with the systemic nature of macroeconomic 
crises and their actual effects. In addition, current policies and ad hoc interventions 
usually fail to take into account the fact that there is a genuine chance that a large 
percentage of the population will fall below the poverty line in the near future (Glewwe 
and Hall 1998). As a result, policies need to be redesigned and redirected to address 
such issues (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000; Holzmann 2001a). 
Third, the adoption of a macro approach helps to raise a critique of the current, 
influential ‘macro’ literature on trade and poverty, which argues that trade is good for 
growth and growth is good for the poor (Dollar and Kraay 2000 and 2001). We argue 
that the ability of a country to benefit from full integration into a more open 
international economic environment strongly depends on its national characteristics and 
on the availability of effective coping mechanisms.  
This macro approach is also subject to a number of caveats. First of all, as we focus on 
aggregate variables in cross-country comparisons, we deal only with covariant macro 
shocks at the country level (i.e., shocks affecting the variables on average, impacting on 
the population uniformly), without taking into account the differences among 
households or income distribution effects. Our results may thus differ across the social 
groups within each country while the relative income position of households is likely to 
have an important effect on their ability to have access to adequate tools and coping 
mechanisms. This shortcoming, however, is moderated by the evidence that also the 
aggregated effects hurt the poor disproportionately (Lundberg and Squire 2003; Lustig 
2000). To overcome such a drawback, we also test the robustness of our results on the 
poorest quintile of the population. 
Second, we take into account the limits of the cross-section analysis, even though we 
are aware that in our case it remains the best choice within the ‘cost-benefit tradeoff’ of 
                                                 
7  Although some of the crises received considerable attention in the media (Mexico 1995; Southeast 
Asia 1997; Brazil and Russia 1998, and Argentina 2001), these, as highlighted also by the World 
Bank (2000a), represent merely the tip of the iceberg of a much vaster and more complex 
phenomenon.  
6 
the appropriate sample length. In fact, while with a longer sample we could have 
increased measurement accuracy, this phenomenon is likely to change over time, due to 
diverging characteristics and the performance of shocks and transmission channels 
(World Bank 2003a). Cross-section comparisons force us to adopt common thresholds 
within the sample. However, we can easily remove this assumption without invalidating 
the results. 
Third, as one of the aims of the analysis is to propose a methodology that can be applied 
across countries and periods, we restrict ourselves to using macroeconomic data 
available from official international sources.
8 We acknowledge that this might involve 
the risk of missing a number of relevant country-specific issues, but it lets us enjoy the 
benefits and insights of a comparative approach.  
However, we do acknowledge the paucity of analytical tools available for studying the 
effects of macro vulnerability on welfare across countries.
9 The avenue we choose for 
facing this limitation is to relate our trade vulnerability analysis with macro volatility 
studies.10 Although the issue of volatility has been traditionally considered as a business 
cycle phenomenon with only secondary effects for emerging economies, the effects of 
volatility on growth and poverty alleviation are being recognized as a general factor of 
development and has attracted the interest of many scholars (World Bank 2003a). In 
fact, in recent years, episodes of extreme volatility have highlighted an entire new set of 
welfare implications for the developing countries. Moreover, recent empirical studies 
show that the relative volatility of consumption increased during the 1990s with respect 
to income, especially for the more integrated economies (Wolf 2004; Kose, Prasad and 
Silva Terrones 2003a). 
4  A suggested model of macroeconomic vulnerability to trade  
Starting from traditional micro vulnerability literature, in order to extend the 
vulnerability analysis to a higher level of aggregation, we choose to rely on a panel of 
countries rather than on a panel of households and we base our measurement of welfare 
                                                 
8  In this analysis, we use the Global Development Finance (GDF) and World Development Indicators 
(WDI), the primary World Bank database for development data from officially recognized 
international sources. The database is updated quarterly. 
9  With a few exceptions (see Thomas 2003). However, often current studies have largely ignored a 
number of relevant macro issues, such as those related to the lack of policy credibility, or the 
inconsistency between short-term strategies and long-term commitments, and the relationship between 
conflicts and vulnerability (Triulzi and Montalbano 2001 and 2003).  
10 We may divide current volatility literature into two strands: one which analyses the effects of 
volatility, and the other that focuses on its determinants. Most of the literature on the effects of 
volatility suggests a positive relation between volatility and (average) growth. However, there is an 
alternative view, notably applied to emerging markets, which suggests a negative link, based on the 
explanation that greater uncertainty lowers investments in physical and human capital, thereby 
reducing long-term growth (Ramey and Ramey 1995; Martin and Rogers 1997; Talvi and Vegh 2000; 
Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz 2001; Pallage and Robe 2003; Hnatkovska and Loayza 2004). The second 
strand of the literature examines the determinants of particularly high or low volatility (i.e., extreme 
volatility) typically in cross-section analysis (Gavin and Hausmann 1996; Acemoglu et al. 2003; 
Rodrik 1999).   
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on the average growth of annual per capita consumption expenditure, considered as a 
good proxy for permanent income. 
Then, we adopt a mixed approach to detect volatility. First, recalling Ligon and 
Schechter (2003), we define the vulnerability of country i as the difference between the 
expected per capita consumption growth under the hypothesis of no shocks and the 
expected value of the same variable under the hypothesis of shocks. In formula: 
V(ci) = E[ * i c & ] – E[ i c & ] (1) 
where E[ * i c & ] is the expected per capita consumption growth under the hypothesis of no 
shocks and E[ i c & ] is the expected per capita consumption growth under the shocks 
hypothesis. Hence, E[ * i c & ] is our benchmark (similarly to the poverty line in Ligon and 
Schechter 2003). In case of negative shocks, we obviously get E[ i c & ] < E[ * i c & ]. The 
larger the difference between the two measures, the higher the vulnerability of the 
country i.  
Moreover, according to volatility literature (see section 2.2), we also argue that annual 
per capita consumption growth depends upon the volatility of its annual rates of change. 
In formula:  
i c & () i c Vol f & = , i = 1…n,  (2) 
where  i c Vol&  is the standard deviation of per capita consumption rate of change. 
Finally, according to Amin, Rai and Topa (1999), Glewwe and Hall (1998) and the 
literature on the determinants of volatility, we link the volatility of consumption 
expenditures to a set of possible sources of shocks related to trade openness, as follows: 
i c Vol& = g(Volxi), i = 1…n.  (3) 
where xi is the number of trade variables and Volxi their standard deviation. 
Practically speaking, as highlighted by equations (2) and (3), an increased volatility of 
variables related to trade openness will cause increased volatility of per capita 
consumption growth with negative effects on the consumption performances. According 
to this model, cross-country differences in the volatility of per capita consumption 
growth can arise alternatively from differences in the exposure of trade shocks or in the 
availability of coping mechanisms, producing different welfare conditions (Wolf 2004). 
This, in turn, according to equation (1) widens the difference between the expected 
value of actual per capita consumption growth and its potential value (i.e., our 
benchmark). The wider this difference, the more vulnerable the country analysed. 
Moreover, under the hypothesis that the poorest people consume most of their income in 
every period, we also implement the same framework to measure the vulnerability to 
trade shocks of the last quintile of the population. 
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5  Stylized facts about Europe 
Focusing on the actual situation in Europe, as already underlined, the CEECs at the 
beginning of the transition era had not performed as well as many had expected 
However, following a U-shaped path, they succeeded to recover (Figure A1), indicating 
a process of relative convergence to the macroeconomic performance of Western 
European countries (Figure A2).11 
Indeed, from the point of view of per capita consumption, CEECs show a mixed 
performance in the past decade. They registered, on average, with the relevant 
exceptions of the Baltic states, Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary (Annex Table A1), an 
annual per capita consumption growth higher than most Western European countries 
(except Ireland). Moreover, if the standard deviation is used as a metric, CEECs show 
an higher degree of volatility during the same period for almost all the reported 
macroeconomic variables than the Western European countries (Annex Table A2). This 
finding is particularly relevant in the case of trade variables, per capita GDP growth 
rates and, above all, in the case of per capita consumption (Figure A3). In fact, the 
majority of CEECs show a relatively high volatility of consumption with respect to 
income (Figure A4). This result, which is consistent with other empirical analysis on 
emerging countries (see Kose, Prasad and Silva Terrones 2003b; Wolf 2004; World 
Bank 2000b),12 demonstrates that compared to Western European countries, the 
economies in transition in Central and Eastern Europe show a lower ability to maintain 
a stable path of consumption in the presence of output volatility (see also Coricelli and 
Ianchovichina 2003).  
Following Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004), we decompose the registered volatility of 
consumption between normal volatility and extreme volatility. Normal volatility is 
defined as the portion of standard deviation of consumption change that corresponds to 
deviations falling within a threshold (i.e., repeated and small cyclical movements 
around the mean). Extreme volatility is defined as the portion of standard deviation of 
consumption change that is above and below the same threshold (i.e., sharp positive or 
negative fluctuations from the mean). Extreme volatility, in turn, has been subdivided 
into boom volatility and crisis volatility. Here, we concentrate on crisis volatility, i.e., 
the portion of standard deviation of consumption change that corresponds to downward 
deviations below a fixed threshold. To carry out our decomposition, we adopt a 
common threshold set to equal the average volatility of the sampled countries. It 
provides absolute (as opposed to relative, country-specific) measures and, thus, 
facilitates cross-country comparisons. If we examine the cases of Austria and Latvia, 
being the less volatile and the more volatile countries, respectively, in the sample, we 
notice that while Austria experienced no extreme (boom or crisis) volatility, Latvia is 
characterized by relevant episodes of crisis volatility (1991-93 and 1995) and boom 
volatility (1994 and 1996-2001) (Figure A5). 
                                                 
11 Consistently with the Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991 and 1995) hypothesis, among the European 
countries analysed we detect a clear negative relationship between the per capita income growth rate 
and natural log of its initial level (Figure A2). This process of convergence, namely ‘β convergence’, 
does not imply the existence of a reduction in the relative distribution of incomes over time, as in the 
case of the so-called ‘σ convergence’. 
12  They show that while the volatility of output growth has on average declined in the 1990s relative to 
the three earlier decades, the volatility of consumption growth has increased especially for the 
financially more integrated developing countries.  
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6  Trade openness and volatility: an empirical analysis in Europe, 1990-2000 
Starting from this empirical evidence, we ask the questions: do these stylized facts reflect 
clear-cut causal relationships between trade openness and consumption volatility? And, 
eventually, does the increased consumption volatility hurt the anticipated consumption 
performance? 
To find the answers to these questions, an empirical analysis is carried out for 34 
European countries over the period 1990-2000,
13 a decade of dramatic trade liberalization 
and of the implementation of major ‘first type’ reforms for the CEECs (Svejnar 2002).  
To examine whether consumption volatility is associated with trade shocks, consistently 
with equation (3) of our model, we regress the volatility of annual per capita consumption 
growth on the volatility of trade openness and terms of trade,14 also considering a dummy 
EEA in order to isolate the effect in the case of Western European countries.  
The fit of the regression is good, and all coefficients are robust and significant (Table 1). 
The estimates bear the expected signs, denoting a positive and significant relation 
between volatility of the trade variables considered and volatility of consumption. They 
also underline the pervasive role of trade variables in the case of crisis volatility, 
especially terms-of-trade volatility. In addition, with regard to total volatility, the dummy 
EEA is negative and significant, indicating that Western European countries are 
structurally less volatile to trade shocks than the CEECs. 
The next step, according to equation (2) of our model, is to test whether higher levels of 
consumption volatility, as explained by the volatility of trade variables, actually worsen 
the macroeconomic performance of countries in terms of consumption growth. As seen in 
Table 2, the regression results reveal a negative and significant relationship between 
consumption volatility and the growth rates. This turns out to be particularly relevant in 
the case of the extreme and crisis volatility components. The model also highlights that a 
countercyclical behaviour in the management of policy tools is significantly and 
positively linked to good macroeconomic performance (see fiscal dummy for 
countercyclicality).15 This point is particularly relevant, since it underlines the 
fundamental role of the availability of efficient coping mechanisms able to produce 
different welfare conditions.  
                                                 
13 The countries analysed are the Western European countries (members of the European Economic 
Area, EEA) of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom; CEE 
countries of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, and Slovenia; as well as the other European countries of Albania, Belarus, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Russian Federation and Turkey. 
14 We use the following variables from the GDF&WDI central database: per capita household final 
consumption expenditure (constant 1995 US$); terms-of-trade adjustment (constant LCU) and trade 
(per cent of GDP): i.e., the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of 
gross domestic product. 
15 Coutercyclicality is defined as the statistical correlation between the rates of change of final household 
per capita consumption and the rates of change of general final governmental consumption 
expenditure (per cent of GDP). Countercyclicality dummy assumes value 1 when correlation is 
negative, 0 otherwise.  
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These results underline the adverse effect of economic uncertainty on a country’s 
performance; uncertainty that could be related to factors such as macroeconomic 
instability (Judson and Orphanides 1996), institutional weakness (World Bank 2000b; 
Rodrik 1991), political insecurity (Alesina et al. 1996), or, on a theoretical basis, to risk 
aversion and irreversibility of wrong choices (Hnatkovska and Loayza 2004). It is 
important to underline again the pervasive role of crisis volatility as well as the positive 
influence of national policy tools that are able to partially offset the negative effects. 
Table 1 
Effects of trade volatility on consumption volatility 
 Consumption  volatility 



















Dummy EEA   -0.0343089***
0.0107949 
  
     
Test Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg (Prob>chi2) [0.0106]  [0.0338] [0.0011] 
R-squared  0.73 0.62 0.61 
Observations  34 34 34 
Note:  Robust standard errors are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
Source: Authors'  estimation. 
 
Table 2  
Effects of total, extreme and crisis volatility on annual consumption performance 







Total volatility  -0.151357*** 
0.0551836 
  
Extreme volatility    -0.1452526*** 
0.0495562 
 
Crisis volatility      -0.2454084***
0.0705418 






     
Test Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg (Prob>chi2) [0.0761]  [0.0935] [0.5083] 
R-squared  00:25 00:27 00:33 
Observations  34 34 34 
Note:   Standard errors are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
Source: Authors' estimation.  
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With these facts in mind, we strongly support the need to go beyond the apparent 
positive association between trade openness and economic performance, particularly 
with regard to Eastern Europe. Trade liberalization, introducing an entirely new set of 
shocks and incentives, may have actually worsened growth and welfare performance in 
most CEECs, highlighting their actual vulnerability to trade openness. 
7  Trade openness and vulnerability in Europe 
In accordance with our suggested model (section 4), we thus estimate the expected per 
capita consumption rates of change with zero volatility—a measure of the potential 
consumption—and compare these with the actual levels of expected per capita 
consumption rate of change (in presence of volatility).  
These results are reported in Table 3. It is easy to detect that the effect of volatility has 
been particularly relevant for the Baltic states (more than 2 per cent of their potential 
annual per capita consumption growth has been actually lost because of crisis volatility) 
and for the group of ‘other European countries’ (more than 1 per cent). The countries 
most notably affected by volatility are Latvia and Lithuania (almost 3 per cent of their 
potential annual per capita consumption growth has been lost because of ‘crisis 
volatility’). In contrast, among the CEECs7 (the group that also includes the new EU 
member states) and, above all, among Western European countries (EEA member 
countries), the effect of volatility is less relevant, in particular with regard to the impact 
of extreme and crisis volatility.  
Table 3 













Estonia -1.423  -1.271  -1.704    Austria  -0.125 0.000 0.000 
Latvia -2.608  -2.493  -2.931    Belgium  -0.162 0.000 0.000 
Lithuania -2.410  -2.307  -2.758    Denmark  -0.299 0.000 0.000 
Baltic states  -2.147  -2.024  -2.465    Finland  -0.508 -0.254 -0.429 
Albania -1.877  -1.726  -1.416    France  -0.181 0.000 0.000 
Belarus -1.565  -1.486  -1.342    Germany  -0.192 0.000 0.000 
Croatia -1.348  -1.233  -1.139    Greece  -0.174 0.000 0.000 
Macedonia, FYR  -1.148  -1.022  -1.005    Iceland  -0.655 -0.533 -0.589 
Russian Federation  -0.741  -0.470  -0.127    Ireland  -0.329 0.000 0.000 
Turkey -0.839  -0.693  -0.737    Italy  -0.287 -0.211 -0.357 
Other European  -1.253  -1.105  -0.961    Luxembourg  -0.380 -0.193 -0.326 
Bulgaria -1.364  -1.251  -1.534    Netherlands  -0.237 0.000 0.000 
Czech Republic  -1.171  -1.033  -1.479    Norway  -0.177 0.000 0.000 
Hungary -0.641  -0.389  -0.506    Portugal  -0.258 0.000 0.000 
Poland -0.299  0.000  0.000    Spain  -0.240 0.000 0.000 
Romania -1.150  -1.054  -0.916    Sweden  -0.353 0.000 0.000 
Slovak Republic  -1.467  -1.331  -1.855    Switzerland  -0.166 0.000 0.000 
Slovenia -0.932  -0.860  -0.852    United  Kingdom  -0.282 0.000 0.000 
CEECs7 -1.004  -0.845  -1.020    EEA  -0.278 -0.066 -0.095 




Probability of improvement of extreme volatility and its relative effects 
 on annual per capita consumption growth 
  Probability of an improvement in extreme volatility due to: 
  Trade openness     Terms of trade  
  Probability, %   Effects, %     Probability, %   Effects, % 
Estonia 19.57  -0.2688 19.12  -0.1176 
Latvia 20.09  -0.2748  21.94  -0.4021 
Lithuania 21.09  -0.4118  10.23  -0.1389 
Baltic states  20.25  -0.3184 17.10  -0.2195 
Albania 20.49  -0.2234  21.35  -0.0998 
Belarus 21.76  -0.3163  21.94  -0.2745 
Croatia 17.66  -0.2683 20.99  -0.0756 
Macedonia, FYR  19.58  -0.2365  17.85  -0.0961 
Russian Federation  18.84  -0.2498  21.42  -0.1930 
Turkey 9.13  -0.1412  13.78  -0.0549 
Other European  17.91  -0.2392  19.56  -0.1323 
Bulgaria 18.55  -0.1804  0.00  0.0002 
Czech Republic  19.54  -0.2015 21.66  -0.1932 
Hungary 21.38  -0.3027  0.00  -0.0522 
Poland 0.00  -0.0892  0.00  -0.0109 
Romania 13.11  -0.1347  3.91  -0.0608 
Slovak Republic  21.15  -0.3051  20.35  -0.1315 
Slovenia 18.04  -0.1689  0.00  0.0431 
CEECs7 15.97  -0.1975  6.56  -0.0703 
Austria  10.11 -0.1375  0.00 -0.0273 
Belgium 16.40  -0.1650  14.96  -0.0561 
Denmark 6.49  -0.0795  9.10  -0.0541 
Finland 8.33  -0.1230  7.00  -0.0549 
France 0.00  -0.0621  0.00  -0.0134 
Germany 2.20  -0.0904  0.00  -0.0310 
Greece 0.00  -0.0562  0.00  -0.0258 
Iceland 0.00  -0.0744  0.00  -0.0484 
Ireland 21.48  -0.2987  19.37  -0.0660 
Italy 0.00  -0.0765  0.00  -0.0392 
Luxembourg 21.31  -0.3252  12.27  -0.0724 
Netherlands 2.49  -0.1175  0.00  -0.0165 
Norway 0.00  -0.0283  20.92  -0.2200 
Portugal 0.00  -0.0549  6.42  -0.0436 
Spain 4.03  -0.1217  0.00  -0.0176 
Sweden 13.94  -0.1488  16.53  -0.0789 
Switzerland 2.20  -0.0953  14.66  -0.0901 
United Kingdom  0.00  -0.0463  5.88  -0.0545 
EEA 6.06  -0.1167  7.06  -0.0561 
Source: Authors’  estimates. 
Indeed, there are examples of vulnerable countries also among the CEECs (see, for 
instance, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, which lost more than 1 per 
cent of their annual per capita consumption growth because of crisis volatility) and 
among EEA. In the latter case, we should mention Finland, Iceland, Italy and small 
Luxembourg (where, however, the loss due to crisis volatility has been less than 0.5 per 
cent of consumption growth).  
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Practically speaking, if CEECs7, Baltic states and the group of ‘other European 
countries’ had been able to reduce the degree of consumption volatility related to trade 
volatility, they would have achieved higher levels of consumption during the 1990s. 
This is precisely what we are aiming to demonstrate. This empirical exercise shows that 
CEECs’ wellbeing during the 1990s has been remarkably and negatively affected by 
trade shocks, through the impact on consumption volatility, giving us a measure of the 
relative vulnerability of the CEECs to trade openness compared to Western European 
countries in the past decade. 
However, since vulnerability is by definition a forward-looking approach, the 
measurement of vulnerability to trade openness calls for comment on the expected value 
of macroeconomic performance. For this task, we calculate the actual probability of 
each country to suffer a reduction in its annual per capital consumption growth because 
of trade shocks. Thus for each country analysed, we test the probability of an 
improvement of extreme volatility induced by a 25 per cent improvement of volatility of 
trade variables. We then calculate the associated negative effect in terms of a reduction 
in the annual per capita consumption growth.16 The higher the probability of 
improvement of ‘extreme volatility’ in trade variables and the magnitude of its negative 
effect on per capita consumption growth, the higher the degree of vulnerability for a 
given country. 
Table 4 reports the results for each country in the sample. It clearly confirms that 
Western European countries are structurally less vulnerable than other countries in the 
sample, both in the case of increased volatility of trade openness and terms of trade. On 
average, they show very limited probability to be adversely affected by a shock in terms 
of extreme volatility (about 7:100) and even in these unlucky episodes, the induced 
negative effects on annual consumption growth remain small (on average no more than 
-0.05 per cent in the case of terms-of-trade shocks and -0.11 per cent in the case of trade 
openness). Relevant exceptions are Norway, Ireland and Luxembourg which show levels 
of probability of extreme volatility and likely dimensions of negative effects on annual 
consumption similar to those of the Baltic states (i.e., the most vulnerable countries in the 
sample). In particular, the Scandinavian countries show all a clear tendency to achieve 
above-average values among EEA. 
The most vulnerable groups in the sample are the Baltic states and the other European 
countries (the probability of experiencing an extreme volatility is almost 1:5). However, 
the situation is highly divergent among the countries within each group. For instance, 
among the CEECs7, while Czech Republic and Slovak Republic show some of the 
highest probability of extreme volatility in terms of trade and the worst results in terms of 
consumption performance, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia register some of the 
best results. Similarly, among the other European countries, Albania, Russia and Belarus 
show some of the worst performance, while Turkey registers a performance similar to 
most of the Western European countries. 
                                                 
16 Under the hypothesis of a normal distribution of trade variables, we test the following hypothesis:  
H0: s
2≤σ
2 against H1: s
2>σ
2. Under the null hypothesis 2
1 2







where n is the number of years 
considered in the forecast, s
2 is the extreme volatility observed in the sample and σ
2 is the assumed 
higher extreme volatility.  
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However, the actual measurement of the CEECs7’s estimated vulnerability needs a more 
careful approach. We need in fact to take into account that these countries are—or will 
shortly become—new member states of the EU.17 Are these countries likely to experience 
a different volatility path because of EU economic and political integration? In other 
words, will the new member countries experience a sort of synchronization with the 
socioeconomic performance of EEA member countries and stabilization of their degree of 
volatility? 
The obvious reference for testing this hypothesis is the past experience of Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, the Mediterranean EU countries that joined EEC in the 1980s. 
Actually, these countries did show an overall increased synchronization with the older EU 
member countries (Table 5),18 with the relevant exception of Spain with reference to 
trade openness and Greece in the case of terms-of-trade volatility. The situation in terms 
of reduction of extreme volatility is also noteworthy: after accession, neither Portugal nor 
Greece have showed any sharp fluctuations in trade openness and terms-of-trade 
volatility, respectively. 
Assuming that the new EU member countries of Central and Eastern Europe will 
experience trade volatility patterns similar to those of the Mediterranean EU member 
countries, we can thus calculate new probabilities of per capita consumption volatility for 
these countries and the likely impact on their macroeconomic performance (Table 6).  
Of course, in the case of Portugal and Greece, the probability of trade-openness shocks 
and terms-of-trade volatility, respectively, is equal to zero because of the total overall 
reduction of extreme volatility following accession. In the case of a shock in trade 
openness volatility, the CEECs show a lower degree of vulnerability than in the previous  
 
Table 5 
Volatility patterns before and after EU accession 

















































































































































Trade  openness               
Greece 3.467  2.232  -35.61 4.254  1.579  -62.88 7.721  3.811  -50.63 
Portugal 2.169  4.378  101.86  7.398  0.000 -100.00 9.566 4.378  -54.24 
Spain 2.924  3.941  34.75  4.367  5.242 24.21  7.291 9.365  28.44 
                  
Terms  of  trade              
Greece 0.004  0.007  76.32  0.003  0.000 -100.00 0.007 0.007  2.99 
Portugal 0.004  0.001  -78.29 0.013  0.011  -14.10 0.017  0.012  -30.58 
Spain 0.004  0.001  -65.41 0.010  0.009  -12.55 0.014  0.010  -27.16 
Source: Authors’  estimates. 
                                                 
17 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Solvak Republic and Slovenia joined 
European Union on 1 May 2004.  
18  This result is consistent with other similar empirical evidence. For instance, following the 
implementation of the NAFTA Agreement, Mexico also appears to have recorded a larger 
synchronization of its macro volatility with the US and Canada (Kose 2004).  
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exercise under the prevalence of the Greece effects and an improvement of trade 
vulnerability under the Spanish case. Instead, in the case of shocks in terms-of-trade 
volatility, the results are quite surprising: since CEECs will register a decrease in extreme 
volatility less than proportional to total volatility, they actually show a higher degree of 
vulnerability, notwithstanding a reduction of total volatility.  
Table 6 
Probability of improvement of extreme volatility and effects 
on annual per capita consumption growth after EU accession 
  Volatility shocks from trade openness  
 Greece  Portugal  Spain 
Country  Probability %  Effect %  Probability % Effect %  Probability %  Effect % 
Czech Republic  13.21  -0.099   0.00  -0.092   21.55 -0.259 
Estonia 13.24  -0.133  0.00 -0.123  21.57  -0.345 
Hungary 14.95  -0.149  0.00 -0.139  23.38  -0.389 
Latvia 13.73  -0.136  0.00 -0.126  22.10  -0.353 
Lithuania 14.67  -0.203  0.00 -0.188  23.10  -0.529 
Poland 0.00  -0.044  0.00 -0.041  0.00  -0.115 
Slovak Republic  14.73  -0.151 0.00  -0.140 23.15  -0.392 
Slovenia 11.85  -0.083  0.00 -0.077  20.04  -0.217 
  
  Terms-of-trade volatility shock 
 Greece  Portugal  Spain 
  Probability %  Effect %  Probability % Effect %  Probability %  Effect % 
Czech Republic  0.00  -0.199   26.44  -0.134    25.77  -0.141 
Estonia 0.00  -0.121  23.97 -0.082  23.29  -0.086 
Hungary 0.00  -0.054  0.00 -0.036  0.00  -0.038 
Latvia 0.00  -0.414  26.71 -0.279  26.05  -0.293 
Lithuania 0.00  -0.143  14.60 -0.096  13.95  -0.101 
Poland 0.00  -0.011  0.00 -0.008  0.00  -0.008 
Slovak Republic  0.00  -0.135 25.18 -0.091  24.50  -0.096 
Slovenia 0.00  -0.044  0.00 -0.030  0.00  -0.031 
Source: Authors’  estimates. 
8  The effects on the poorest 
As mentioned earlier, we also test the robustness of our results on the economic 
performance of the poorest quintile of the population. Note that in this particular case, 
disposable per capita income19 is considered to be a good proxy of permanent income 
under the key hypothesis that the poorest consume most of their income in every period. 
Consistent with the same empirical exercise carried out for the average level of annual 
per capita consumption volatility, we also found a positive and significant relationship 
between the volatility of trade variables and the volatility of annual per capita income in 
the case of the poorest quintile of the population (Table 7). In addition, dummy EEA 
remains negative and significant and the impact higher in presence of terms-of-trade 
volatility.  
                                                 




Effects of trade volatility on income volatility of the poorest quintile of the population 
  Poorest quintile income volatility 



















Dummy EEA   -0.0256336** 
0.0101201 
  
     
Test Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg (Prob>chi2) [0.0484]  [0.0264] [0.0104] 
R-squared  0.67 0.53 0.49 
Observations  33 33 33 
Note:   Robust standard errors are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
Source: Authors' estimation. 
Table 8 
Effects of total, extreme and crisis volatility on annual rate of change in income 
among the poorest quintile of the population 
 
Dependent variable 
Annual rate of change in the income 







Total volatility  -0.1966422**
0.0831103 
  
Extreme volatility    -0.1923244*** 
0.0719827 
 
Crisis volatility      -0.2178431**
0.1072503 






     
Test Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg (Prob>chi2) [0.4415]  [0.3722] [0.3375] 
R-squared  00:24 00:27 00:21 
Observations  33 33 33 
Note:  Standard errors are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
Source: Authors'  estimation. 
 
Thus, we test for the possible negative effects of income volatility on annual rate of 
income change for the poorest quintile of the population. Once again, consistent with 
the results of the above estimates, the results reveal a negative and significant 
relationship between income volatility and the growth rate together with a significant 
and positive effect of a countercyclical behaviour of fiscal policy (Table 8).  
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Hence, we measure the actual degree of vulnerability, caused by trade openness, of the 
poorest quintile of the population for each country in our sample. These results are again 
consistent with the average outputs. The most vulnerable poor live primarily in the 
Baltic states, followed by other European countries and CEECs7 (with the relevant 
exceptions of Bulgaria and Slovenia), while the poorest populations in the most of the 
Western European countries are not vulnerable to trade shocks, except in Finland, 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 
 
Table 9 













Estonia  -1.677 -1.638 -1.261   Austria  -0.233 0.000  0.000 
Latvia  -2.477 -2.402 -2.053   Belgium  -0.272 0.000  0.000 
Lithuania  -1.913 -1.871 -1.374   Denmark  -0.273 0.000  0.000 
Baltic  states  -2.022 -1.970 -1.563   Finland  -0.770 -0.538  -0.509 
Albania  -2.488 -2.145 -2.069   France  -0.244 0.000  0.000 
Belarus  -1.571 -1.477 -0.946   Germany  -0.284 0.000  0.000 
Croatia  -1.835 -1.742 -1.385   Greece  -0.345 0.180  0.204 
Macedonia,  FYR  -0.782 -0.580 -0.405    Iceland       
Russian  Federation  -1.499 -1.431 -0.718   Ireland  -0.581 -0.137  -0.155 
Turkey  -1.086 -1.019 -0.763   Italy  -0.217 0.000  0.000 
Other  European  -1.544 -1.444 -1.048   Luxembourg -0.574 0.000  0.000 
Bulgaria  -1.058 -0.937 -0.680   Netherlands  -0.219 0.000  0.000 
Czech  Republic  -0.585 -0.670 -0.628   Norway  -0.241 0.000  0.000 
Hungary  -0.945 -0.689 -0.703    Portugal -0.378 -0.197  -0.223 
Poland  -0.741 0.527 0.597    Spain -0.271 0.000  0.000 
Romania  -1.172 -1.080 -0.717   Sweden  -0.497 0.000  0.000 
Slovak  Republic  -1.230 -1.097 -0.994   Switzerland  -0.277 0.000  0.000 
Slovenia  -0.094 -0.000 -0.000    United Kingdom -0.310 0.000  0.000 
CEECs7 -0.871  -0.714  0.617    EEA -0.352 -0.062  -0.064 
Source: Authors’  estimates. 
9 Conclusions 
This paper offers a substantive contribution to the debate on the role of international 
trade on the development of emerging countries. More specifically, it tries to fill a 
missing link in the theory between trade shocks, volatility, and the wellbeing of 
countries. To achieve this aim, the paper presents a methodology to study these 
relationships and explores, both conceptually and empirically, the case of Eastern 
Europe.  
The main result of the analysis is that in spite of the apparent association between trade 
openness and good macroeconomic performance, Eastern European countries have 
experienced a deterioration of their macroeconomic wellbeing as a result of the trade 
shocks of the early 1990s. Moreover, it is the ‘extreme’ component of the  volatility of  
18 
trade variables that has the strongest negative effects on the macroeconomic 
performance of partner countries. This has to be related to the limited ability of the more 
fragile countries in terms of their economy and institutional capacity to cope with a 
higher degree of ‘uncertainty’ as well as the poor utilization of adequate policy tools 
which would be able to mitigate the repercussions of trade shocks on the domestic 
economy. These results are robust also in the case of the poorest quintile of the 
population, sparking concern for the actual subsistence of these people in case of trade 
shocks.  
These results spurs some general and relevant policy implications both at the national 
and supranation levels. First of all, countries need to act in order to limit the impact of 
trade shocks on the volatility of their macroeconomic framework, as this is likely to 
worsen their macroeconomic welfare. This implies the need to adopt specific and 
forward-looking national policies to support the trade liberalization process, i.e., 
policies both to mitigate the impact of trade shocks on the national economy and to 
enhance the ‘coping mechanisms’ of the population in the face of external shocks. In 
view of this goal, a micro approach which, for instance, would limit policy intervention 
to risk insurance tailored to specific target groups would appear to be insufficient.  
Second, countries with weak institutions and imperfect internal markets risk being 
adversely affected by the consequences of globalization. Hence, the governance of the 
globalization process needs to be improved, establishing a new ‘culture of prevention’ 
and designing policies that are able to limit the size and frequency of shocks at the 
international level. In other words, multilateral agreements and international institutions 
should play a role in reducing the degree of risk exposure within the current 
international setting. 
This paper points to a new direction for future research. It is, for instance, fundamental 
to test and improve the methodology by broadening on the one hand the areas of 
research (e.g., to include other shocks linked to trade openness) and the instruments 
adopted and  deepening, on the other hand, the level of analysis so as to conduct specific 










1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CEECs 7 Baltic Other European  
Note:   The CEECs7  = Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia. 
  Other European  = Albania, Belarus, Macedonia FYR and Russian Federation. 
  Baltic states  = Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Source:   World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
Figure A2 
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Consumption volatility (standard deviation)  
The European picture, 1990-2001 







































Source: Authors’  estimates. 
 
Figure A4 
Consumption volatility (standard deviation) relative to income volatility 
The European picture, 1990-2001 













































Volatility decomposition of per capita consumption rates of change, 1991-2001 













































Annex Table A1 
Average annual per capita consumption growth in Europe, 1990-2001 
Average annual per capita consumption growth 
Estonia   0.83        Austria   1.92   
Latvia    -1.76     Belgium    1.78  
Lithuania    -2.24     Denmark    1.53  
Baltic states    1.92     Finland    1.10   
Albania   4.47      France   1.05   
Belarus   0.60      Germany   1.60   
Croatia   3.13      Greece   1.96   
Macedonia,  FYR  1.39      Iceland   2.28   
Russian  Federation   1.74      Ireland   4.72   
Turkey   1.74      Italy   1.55   
Other European    2.44     Luxembourg    1.54   
Bulgaria    -1.93     Netherlands    2.15  
Czech  Republic   1.36      Norway   2.44   
Hungary   0.06      Portugal   2.94   
Poland   4.86      Spain   1.74   
Romania   1.74      Sweden   1.74   
Slovak  Republic   1.74      Switzerland   1.74   
Slovenia   1.74      United  Kingdom   1.74   
CEECs7   -1.93      EEA   1.53   
Source:  World Bank, WDI. 
  
 
Annex Table A2 
 Volatility of CEECs main macroeconomic variables, 1990-2001 (standard deviation) 
 Per  capita 
consumption growth 
rate (annual %) 
GDP per capita 
growth rate  
(annual %) 
Per capita consumption 
rate/per capita 



















Albania 9.484  6.439  1.473  1.11  0.106 16.661  21.466 18.895  3.583 
Bulgaria 5.283  5.263  1.004  0.31 0.039  11.358  5.316 9.187 3.932 
Croatia 5.064  6.817  0.743  0.73 0.047  8.224  3.441 7.371 5.718 
Czech Republic  3.218  2.695  1.194  0.91 0.043  13.110  5.503 7.047 2.520 
Estonia 9.947  8.419  1.181 1.26  0.053  20.952 3.581 10.159  3.939 
Hungary 3.303  2.475  1.335  0.83  0.065 23.435  2.813 6.559 3.409 
Latvia 15.635  12.867  1.215 1.41  0.074  17.976 16.306 9.989  6.190 
Lithuania 3.169  10.285  0.308  1.40 0.053  30.257  6.196 3.459 3.759 
Poland 1.988  1.764  1.127  0.77  0.045 6.795  3.378 4.749 2.792 
Romania 5.875  4.792  1.226  0.30  0.058 7.691  5.990 10.135 1.670 
Slovak Republic  4.283  4.183  1.024 0.39  0.058  14.509 4.113 8.341  5.086 
Slovenia 4.611  2.851  1.618  0.84 0.038  3.674  3.819 9.342 3.113 
                 
CEECs7 4.080  3.432  1.189  0.62  0.050 11.510  4.419 7.909 3.217 
Baltic states  9.584  10.524 0.911  1.36  0.060  23.062 8.694 7.869  4.629 
EEA 1.70  1.717  0.991  0.54  0.057 8.989  2.411 7.670  2.048 
Other European  7.64  6.302  1.212  0.75 0.068  13.226  9.038 17.954 3.160 
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